Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller

DOI10.1007/s10058-005-0125-yzbMath1100.91031OpenAlexW2000233008MaRDI QIDQ2493234

Jacques Robert, Bernard Caillaud

Publication date: 12 June 2006

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0125-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement ⋮ Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale ⋮ Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization ⋮ Revenue maximization with a single sample

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