Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
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Publication:2424243
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0621-2zbMath1411.91421OpenAlexW2800613572MaRDI QIDQ2424243
Publication date: 24 June 2019
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0621-2
fairnessconsistencyefficiencyimmediate acceptance ruledeferred acceptance ruletop-trading cycles rule
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Cites Work
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- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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