A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.08.002MaRDI QIDQ2108757zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nanyang Bu

Publication date 20 December 2022

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

assignment of object typesbounded no-envyimmediate acceptance rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
• Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms

Cites work

• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
• Efficient priority rules
• Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare
• Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

Cited in

(11)

• Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
• Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6466174 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6004850 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
• Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Maximin share based mechanisms for multi-resource fair allocation with divisible and indivisible tasks
• Consistent bilateral assignment
• Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
• Price of fairness for allocating a bounded resource
• Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems

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