A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
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Cites work
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
- Efficient priority rules
- Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare
- Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
Cited in
(11)- Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
- Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6466174 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6004850 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Maximin share based mechanisms for multi-resource fair allocation with divisible and indivisible tasks
- Consistent bilateral assignment
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- Price of fairness for allocating a bounded resource
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
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