A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.002zbMath1505.91193OpenAlexW4292320051MaRDI QIDQ2108757

Nanyang Bu

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

assignment of object typesbounded no-envyimmediate acceptance rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems ⋮ Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types

Cites Work

• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
• Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Efficient priority rules
• Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities

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