Coalition preferences with individual prospects

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.006zbMath1400.91150OpenAlexW2775199561WikidataQ57461785 ScholiaQ57461785MaRDI QIDQ1651307

Manel Baucells, Dov Samet

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete preferencespreference aggregationextended Pareto rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10)

Cites Work

• The shape of incomplete preferences
• Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.
• Expected multi-utility representations
• Consistent Bayesian aggregation
• A representation of partially ordered preferences
• Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
• Multiperson utility
• Group Decisions with Multiple Criteria
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• Relative Utilitarianism
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom: A Correction

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