Representation and aggregation of preferences under uncertainty
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Publication:938055
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.10.001zbMath1140.91340OpenAlexW1979502718MaRDI QIDQ938055
Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, Jean-Marc Tallon, Thibault Gajdos
Publication date: 18 August 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.10.001
Related Items (19)
Harsanyi's theorem without the sure-thing principle: on the consistent aggregation of monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences ⋮ Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory ⋮ The ex ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty ⋮ Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects ⋮ An inequality measure for stochastic allocations ⋮ Ambiguity, data and preferences for information -- a case-based approach ⋮ Aggregation of multiple prior opinions ⋮ Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information ⋮ Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts ⋮ Utilitarianism with and without expected utility ⋮ Separate aggregation of beliefs and values under ambiguity ⋮ Fully Bayesian aggregation ⋮ Collective decision under ignorance ⋮ Belief-averaging and relative utilitarianism ⋮ Decision-making with partial information ⋮ Aggregation of opinions in networks of individuals and collectives ⋮ Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements ⋮ Social rationality, separability, and equity under uncertainty ⋮ On weighted utilitarianism and an application
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