Voting operators in the space of choice functions
A new formalization of the problem of social choice (Arrow-like problem) is considered. Under a finite set a of variants and a finite set of voters both individual opinions and a collective decision are assumed to be described not by binary relations but by choice functions: \(C_ i(\cdot)\) and \(C(\cdot)\), respectively. Local voting operators are introduced, according to which the decision on the inclusion of a variant \(x\) into a choice \(C(X)\), \(X\subseteq A\), is made using the information about the inclusion of a variant \(x\) into voters' choice \(C_ i(X)\). Three classes of local operators are separately treated: (1) fixed by characteristic conditions (e.g. by non-imposedness, monotonicity, etc.), (2) isolated by structural conditions (i.e. by restrictions on the domains of specification and the range of operators) and (3) the class of operators given in an explicit form. In the class of operators, satisfying characteristic conditions special subclasses are defined: the Central Region consisting of operators obeying simultaneously the conditions of non-imposedness, monotonicity and neutrality to variants, and the Symmetrically-Central Region in which the operators satisfy the condition of anonymity as well. The classes of choice functions satisfying the conditions of Heritage \((\mathbb H)\), Concordance \((\mathbb C)\) and Independence of rejecting outcast variants \((\mathbb O)\) and their conjunctions [see the survey of the first author in Soc. Choice Welfare 2, 235--282 (1985; Zbl 0583.90004)] are used as the domains of specification \((Q_ S)\), and the ranges \((Q_ N)\) of the operators. The correlation \(Q_ S\subseteq Q_ N\) is supposed to be true as well. Two principles of mutual exclusive neutralities are established according to which the intersection of the symmetrically-central region with the class of operators closedness for the domain \(Q\) (i.e. the class of operators which guarantee the transformation of the individual functions of the domain \(Q\) into the collective one of \(Q\)) when \(Q=\mathbb C\) consists only of the operator ``unanimity, and when \(Q=\mathbb O\) consists of the one operator ``at least one vote for. These two principles imply a number of theorems on the operators from the set which is equal to the intersection of symmetrically-central region and the class of operators closedness for the different well-known domains of choice functions (Plott's functions, pair-dominant and criterial-generated choice functions). Particularly it is shown that if voters' functions are generated by an optimization procedure on a set of criteria, then in the symmetrically-central region no operators exist constructing the collective choice function of the same domain. The intersection set of the central and symmetrically-central regions with different classes of operators closedness are studied and an explicit form of these operators are established. It turns out particularly that the intersection of the central region with the class of operators closedness for the domain \(\mathbb H\cap\mathbb C\cap\mathbb O\) is described by ``dictator type operators - a result analogous to the well-known theorem by K. J. Arrow. Moreover, generalizations of the results are considered in the paper for the case when the condition of non-imposedness is omitted. In another paper of the second author [Proc. Inst. Control Sciences, Moscow, 62--69 (1985)] results are obtained for the case when the condition \(Q_ S\subseteq Q_ r\) is violated. In this paper the domains \(Q_ S\) and \(R_ r\) have the same domains \(\mathbb H\), \(\mathbb C\) and \(\mathbb O\) and their intersections are considered. It is shown that there are no operators in the central region which provide such a transformation when \(Q_ S\not\subseteq Q_ r\). The detailed analysis of the operators guaranteeing such a transformation is made.
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- Majority functional operators in voting theory
- Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case
- Voting procedures in the space of choice functions: Non-monotonic case
- Functional local operators in voting theory. II
- Functional local operators in voting theory. I
- Functional local operators in voting theory. III
- Choice functions and extensive operators
- Voting in combinatorial domains
- Implementation of voting operators
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- Decomposition of choice functions into a system of simpler functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case
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- On dynamic aggregation systems
- Implementation of voting operators
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- A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem
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- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators
- A comment on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- On one class of non-local aggregation rules
- The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
- Functional local operators in voting theory. II
- Local functional operators of partial and nonempty choice of alternatives
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