Voting operators in the space of choice functions
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Cites work
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- Decomposition of choice functions into a system of simpler functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- Local operators in models of social choice
- Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Path-Independent Social Choice Functions: A Further Result
- Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
- Social choice and individual values
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Some aspects of the general theory of best option choice
- Some Further Results on Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
Cited in
(28)- Local operators in models of social choice
- Functional local operators in voting theory. III
- Hierarchical voting
- Nonlocal voting method
- Quasilocal collective choice operators
- Majority functional operators in voting theory
- Impossibility results for choice correspondences
- Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case
- Lattices of choice functions and consensus problems
- Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions
- Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
- Dictatorial voting operators
- Voting procedures in the space of choice functions: Non-monotonic case
- Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
- Limits on power and rationality
- Functional local operators in voting theory. I
- On dynamic aggregation systems
- Implementation of voting operators
- The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
- A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Arrowian social equilibrium: indecisiveness, influence and rational social choices under majority rule
- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators
- A comment on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- On one class of non-local aggregation rules
- The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
- Functional local operators in voting theory. II
- Local functional operators of partial and nonempty choice of alternatives
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