Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem

DOI10.2307/2297147MaRDI QIDQ3934104zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David M. Grether, Charles R. Plott

Publication date 1982

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297147

zbMATH Keywords

impossibility theoremnonbinary social choicesets of feasible alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(22)

• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
• New problems in the general choice theory
• Voting operators in the space of choice functions
• Some impossibility results with domain restrictions
• Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative
• Some further results on nonbinary social choice
• Social choice in economic environments
• Symmetric social choices and collective rationality
• The Arrow and Plott independence conditions
• Impossibility results for choice correspondences
• Arrow's choice axiom
• Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
• Continuous-valued social choice
• On non-binary social choice
• Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
• Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
• A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
• Independent social choice correspondences
• Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
• Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power
• A unifying impossibility theorem
• No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems

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