Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(92)90073-IMaRDI QIDQ1197649zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Denis Bouyssou

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(92)90073-I

zbMATH Keywords

aggregation procedureArrow's impossibility resultoligarchies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
• On realizable biorders and the biorder dimension of a relation
• Partially Ordered Sets
• Social choice and individual values

Cited in

(5)

• Arrow's paradox and mathematical theory of democracy
• Pointwise aggregation of maps: its structural functional equation and some applications to social choice theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4087371 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1974590 (Why is no real title available?)
• Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators

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