The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited

DOI10.1016/J.IJAR.2016.07.012MaRDI QIDQ324692zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Raúl Pérez-Fernández, Michaël Rademaker, B. De Baets

Publication date 17 October 2016

Published in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2016.07.012

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitymonometricranking rulesocial choicescorix

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

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• A stochastic dominance analysis of ranked voting systems with scoring
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• Learning partial ordinal class memberships with kernel-based proportional odds models
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
• Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
• Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
• Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Social Choice and Individual Ranking I
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization

Cited in

(4)

• Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
• Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency
• Monotonicity as a tool for differentiating between truth and optimality in the aggregation of rankings
• Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties

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