Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.03.002MaRDI QIDQ2334862zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Laura Kasper, Dries Vermeulen, Hans Peters

Publication date 8 November 2019

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/40dd57f7-1afb-4e6b-a97e-3907fc643a0e

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet consistencymaximal voting correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1897331 (Why is no real title available?)
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
• Extending Condorcet's rule
• Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity
• Social choice and individual values
• The bargaining problem
• The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
• Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods

Cited in

(14)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6449397 (Why is no real title available?)
• An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences
• The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
• Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
• An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
• Condorcet’s Paradox and Ultrafilters
• Condorcet's principle and the preference reversal paradox
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
• Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
• When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
• New inconsistency indicators for incomplete pairwise comparisons matrices

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