Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.002zbMath1426.91098OpenAlexW2932950958WikidataQ128159005 ScholiaQ128159005MaRDI QIDQ2334862

Dries Vermeulen, Laura Kasper, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 8 November 2019

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/40dd57f7-1afb-4e6b-a97e-3907fc643a0e

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet consistencymaximal voting correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

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Cites Work

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• Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
• The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
• The Bargaining Problem
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions

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