Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
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Publication:2334862
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.002zbMath1426.91098OpenAlexW2932950958WikidataQ128159005 ScholiaQ128159005MaRDI QIDQ2334862
Dries Vermeulen, Laura Kasper, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/40dd57f7-1afb-4e6b-a97e-3907fc643a0e
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