Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox
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Publication:1704047
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1032-1zbMath1392.91051arXiv1608.07410OpenAlexW2517616359MaRDI QIDQ1704047
Publication date: 8 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.07410
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