Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox
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Publication:1704047
Abstract: Consider the framework of topological aggregation introduced by Chichilnisky (1980). We prove that in this framework the Twin Paradox and the No Show Paradox cannot be avoided. Anonymity and unanimity are not needed to obtain these results.
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