Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox
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Publication:1704047
DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1032-1zbMATH Open1392.91051arXiv1608.07410OpenAlexW2517616359MaRDI QIDQ1704047FDOQ1704047
Authors: Guillaume Chèze
Publication date: 8 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Consider the framework of topological aggregation introduced by Chichilnisky (1980). We prove that in this framework the Twin Paradox and the No Show Paradox cannot be avoided. Anonymity and unanimity are not needed to obtain these results.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.07410
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