Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.04.002zbMATH Open1229.91112OpenAlexW2088473264MaRDI QIDQ554496FDOQ554496

Authors: E. Garcia, Joaquín Pérez, José Luis Jimeno 

Publication date: 4 August 2011

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.04.002

Recommendations

• Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
• The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
• An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences

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