The structure of social decision functions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4MaRDI QIDQ761329zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors D. Kelsey

Publication date 1984

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4

zbMATH Keywords

transitivitydirected graphsPareto principleacyclicitysocial preferencesArrow Impossibility Theoremcollective rationality conditionweaker assumptions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Preferenza sociale non transitiva e teorema di Arrow
• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
• Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3652373 (Why is no real title available?)
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto

Cited in

(15)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3914021 (Why is no real title available?)
• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• Universal characterization of non-transitive preferences
• Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
• Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
• Preferenza sociale non transitiva e teorema di Arrow
• Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• The liberal paradox: A generalisation
• Decision making beyond arrow's “impossibility theorem,” with the analysis of effects of collusion and mutual attraction
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930803 (Why is no real title available?)
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions

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