The structure of social decision functions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4MaRDI QIDQ761329zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors D. Kelsey

Publication date 1984

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityArrow Impossibility Theoremcollective rationality conditiondirected graphsPareto principlesocial preferencestransitivityweaker assumptions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This paper presents a theorem on aggregating individual preferences into one consistent ordering for society. This result is similar to the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, however it makes weaker assumptions. Specifically we do not require that the social preference be transitive but merely that it be acyclic. Acyclicity of preferences is argued to be a necessary and sufficient condition for consistent decision making [see \textit{A. Sen}, Econometrica 45, 53-89 (1977; Zbl 0353.90001)]. Transitivity is not essential for decisions. This limits the relevance of results in transitive social choice for collective decisions. In addition we do not use the Pareto principle which was another of Arrow's assumptions. Unlike Arrow we are not able to conclude that there is a dictator. However even with substantially weaker assumptions than Arrow we are able to conclude that significant elements of dictatorship persist. In summary we show that the nature of social choice will remain very arbitrary and unsatisfactory even if only two of Arrow's assumptions, unrestricted domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives, are imposed. These are the two purely structural assumptions. As far as we know there are no other 'impossibility' theorems with as few assumptions. The proof is based on the theory of directed graphs and uses a result of Bollobas.

Recommendations

• Preferenza sociale non transitiva e teorema di Arrow
• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
• Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cites work

• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3652373 (Why is no real title available?)
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts

Cited in

(16)

• Acyclic choice and group veto
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
• The liberal paradox: A generalisation
• Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
• Universal characterization of non-transitive preferences
• Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
• Preferenza sociale non transitiva e teorema di Arrow
• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
• Decision making beyond arrow's “impossibility theorem,” with the analysis of effects of collusion and mutual attraction
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3914021 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930803 (Why is no real title available?)
• Escaping Arrow's theorem: the advantage-standard model
• Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem

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