Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
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(15)- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
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- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning
- Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition
- A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3934707 (Why is no real title available?)
- On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
- Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry
- On the existence of a fixed-number equilibrium in a multiparty electoral system
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