Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records

DOI10.1007/S11238-010-9240-5zbMATH Open1274.91162OpenAlexW3121841985MaRDI QIDQ656882FDOQ656882

Authors: Eyal Baharad, Jacob Goldberger, Shmuel Nitzan, Moshe Koppel 

Publication date: 13 January 2012

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3323.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Condorcetsimple majority ruleoptimal aggregation rulevoting record

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result
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• A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
• Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
• Monotonicity in Condorcet jury theorem
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
• Stay away from fair coins: a Condorcet jury theorem
• When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?

Cited In (18)

• Voting rules as statistical estimators
• A general theorem and eight corollaries in search of correct decision
• Combining expert judgment: On the performance of trimmed mean vote aggregation procedures in the presence of strategic voting
• Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution
• On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees
• Three new models for preference voting and aggregation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
• General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
• Crowdvoting judgment: an analysis of modern peer review
• One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic?
• Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
• Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
• Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type
• Who should cast the casting vote? Using sequential voting to amalgamate information
• The importance of voting order for jury decisions by sequential majority voting
• On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
• Optimal policymaking under yardstick vote: an experimental study

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