Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences

DOI10.1007/S10479-023-05430-2zbMATH Open1545.91122MaRDI QIDQ6573343FDOQ6573343

Kazuhisa Makino, Ondřej Čepek, Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich

Publication date: 16 July 2024

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

polynomial time recognition algorithmvoting schemedistributed approval votingvoting correspondencevoting form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Normalized range voting broadly resists control
• A simple characterization of approval voting
• Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game forms
• Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
• Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms: characterization and main properties
• Weighted approval voting
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Über kombinatorische Eigenschaften von Matrizen.
• Graphen und Matrices.
• On effectivity functions of game forms
• The learnability of voting rules
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions
• War and peace in veto voting

This page was built for publication: Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6573343)