Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences

DOI10.1007/S10479-023-05430-2MaRDI QIDQ6573343zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Endre Boros, Ondřej Čepek, Vladimir Gurvich, Kazuhisa Makino

Publication date 16 July 2024

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10479-023-05430-2

zbMATH Keywords

distributed approval votingpolynomial time recognition algorithmvoting correspondencevoting formvoting scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

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• Weighted approval voting
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