Persuasion under ambiguity
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Publication:829506
DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09764-2zbMath1461.91093OpenAlexW3038185405MaRDI QIDQ829506
T. Florian Kauffeldt, Jonas Hedlund, Malte Lammert
Publication date: 6 May 2021
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09764-2
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