Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
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Publication:4612469
DOI10.3982/TE2914zbMATH Open1419.91128WikidataQ129049146 ScholiaQ129049146MaRDI QIDQ4612469FDOQ4612469
Authors: Rahul Deb, Colin Stewart 
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- A principal-agent model of sequential testing
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Uncertainty, Information, and Sequential Experiments
- Repeated Moral Hazard
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- Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing
- The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
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- On the Design and Comparison of Certain Dichotomous Experiments
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- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
Cited In (10)
- Delegated concept testing in new product development
- A Nearly-Quadratic Gap between Adaptive and Non-adaptive Property Testers
- Setting an exam as an information design problem
- Reasonable doubt
- Informative tests in signaling environments
- Sequential decisions with tests
- Game-theoretic question selection for tests
- Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
- A Bayesian-optimal principle for learner-friendly adaptation in learning games
- Test Design Under Falsification
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