Belief inducibility and informativeness

DOI10.1007/S11238-023-09963-7MaRDI QIDQ6540649zbMATHFDO

Authors P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dominik Karos, Toygar T. Kerman

Publication date 17 May 2024

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryinformativenessinformation designinducible distributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Information revelation through signalling
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces

Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
• Agreeing to disagree
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Bounds on the probability of radically different opinions
• Competition in persuasion
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications
• Information hierarchies
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Interactive information design
• Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
• On the relationship between individual and group decisions
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• The maximal difference among expert's opinions
• Two representations of information structures and their comparisons

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