On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
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Publication:1787705
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.05.023zbMATH Open1397.91096OpenAlexW3125356934WikidataQ129718888 ScholiaQ129718888MaRDI QIDQ1787705FDOQ1787705
Authors: Yanyan Li 
Publication date: 5 October 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.023
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Cites Work
Cited In (21)
- Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
- Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
- Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly
- Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Sequential persuasion
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Competitive disclosure of correlated information
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Algorithms for persuasion with limited communication
- Multi-agent persuasion: leveraging strategic uncertainty
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
- Competition in persuasion: an experiment
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
- Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
- Testing, disclosure and approval
- Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Interactive information design
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