On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.05.023zbMath1397.91096OpenAlexW3125356934WikidataQ129718888 ScholiaQ129718888MaRDI QIDQ1787705

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.023

zbMATH Keywords

multiple sendersBayesian persuasionbelief-splitting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (13)

Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ Interactive Information Design ⋮ Testing, disclosure and approval ⋮ Competition in persuasion: an experiment ⋮ Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying ⋮ Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces ⋮ Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders ⋮ Competitive disclosure of correlated information ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

Cites Work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competition in Persuasion

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