Multi-agent persuasion: leveraging strategic uncertainty

DOI10.1111/IERE.12546MaRDI QIDQ5042686zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tetsuya Hoshino

Publication date 25 October 2022

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12546

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

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(6)

• The strategy of manipulating joint decision-making
• Global manipulation by local obfuscation
• Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
• A scalable Bayesian persuasion framework for epidemic containment on heterogeneous networks
• Implementation via information design in binary-action supermodular games

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