Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
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Publication:4823480
DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00289zbMath1096.91044OpenAlexW3121216588MaRDI QIDQ4823480
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00289
2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (7)
Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination ⋮ Unobservable contracts as precommitments ⋮ Privatization, incentive delegation and foreign direct investment ⋮ When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game ⋮ Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information ⋮ Optimal collusion with internal contracting ⋮ Games played in a contracting environment
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