Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
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Publication:4823480
DOI10.7916/D8C257NF 10.1111/0034-6527.00289; 10.7916/D8C257NFzbMath1096.91044MaRDI QIDQ4823480
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00289
91A05: 2-person games
91A18: Games in extensive form
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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