Privatization, incentive delegation and foreign direct investment

DOI10.1007/S11079-012-9251-7zbMath1412.91234OpenAlexW2005528934MaRDI QIDQ2416030

Arijit Mukherjee, Kullapat Suetrong

Publication date: 23 May 2019

Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-012-9251-7

zbMATH Keywords

welfareincentive contractprivatizationgreenfield FDI

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cites Work

• Unobservable contracts as precommitments
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Unobserved Delegation
• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• Technology transfer with commitment.

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