Unobservable contracts as precommitments
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Publication:878404
DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0111-9zbMATH Open1114.91074OpenAlexW2131132120MaRDI QIDQ878404FDOQ878404
Authors: Levent Koçkesen 
Publication date: 26 April 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0111-9
Recommendations
- Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
- Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
- Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
- Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
Cites Work
- Unobserved Delegation
- Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
- Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
- Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
- Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
- Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
Cited In (9)
- Textbook non-malleable commitments
- Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
- Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
- Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
- Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
- Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
- Privatization, incentive delegation and foreign direct investment
- Preordered service in contract enforcement
- Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
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