Optimal collusion with limited liability

DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2013.12015.XzbMATH Open1416.91266OpenAlexW2168867014MaRDI QIDQ4583981FDOQ4583981

Authors: Etienne Billette De Villemeur, Laurent Flochel, Bruno Versaevel 

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38481/1/MPRA_paper_38481.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

collusionoligopolylimited liability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cited In (11)

• Is capital a collusion device?
• Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth
• Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
• Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts
• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule
• Marginal costs and collusive sustainability
• The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model
• Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example

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