Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing

DOI10.1007/S712-002-8220-0zbMATH Open1010.91081OpenAlexW2083262948MaRDI QIDQ698192FDOQ698192

Authors: Barnali Gupta, Guhan Venkatu 

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s712-002-8220-0

Recommendations

• Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model
• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model
• Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
• Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly
• Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms

zbMATH Keywords

locationdelivered pricingduopoloytacit collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cited In (11)

• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model
• Full collusion vs. partial collusion in a spatial model: price and welfare comparison
• ENDOGENOUS FLEXIBILITY IN THE FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM
• Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model
• Consistent location conjectures under spatial price discrimination
• The shelf space and pricing strategies for a retailer-dominated supply chain with consignment based revenue sharing contracts
• Mixed oligopolies and collusion
• Spatial price discrimination in the unidirectional Hotelling model with elastic demand
• A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion
• Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly
• Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs

This page was built for publication: Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q698192)