Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.003MaRDI QIDQ536104zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toshihiro Matsumura, Noriaki Matsushima

Publication date 16 May 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.b.kobe-u.ac.jp/papers_files/2009_05.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusioncost asymmetryspatial agglomeration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

• Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
• Full collusion vs. partial collusion in a spatial model: price and welfare comparison
• Cournot competition and spatial agglomeration revisited.
• A model of location choice: Cournot competition and spatial agglomeration
• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model

Cites work

• Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
• Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome.
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity

Cited in

(17)

• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model
• Full collusion vs. partial collusion in a spatial model: price and welfare comparison
• Welfare properties of strategic R\&D investments in Hotelling models
• Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing
• The nature of equilibria under noncollusive product design and collusive pricing
• Heterogeneous firms, urban costs and agglomeration
• Competition among large and heterogeneous small firms
• Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
• Mixed oligopolies and collusion
• Product differentiation in a vertical structure
• Information asymmetry as a source of spatial agglomeration
• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
• Vertical contract and competition intensity in Hotelling's model
• Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
• Endogenous flexibility in the flexible manufacturing system
• Cournot competition and spatial agglomeration revisited.
• Agglomeration as spatial interdependence between firms and households

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