Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:536104
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.003zbMATH Open1236.91109OpenAlexW2170610265MaRDI QIDQ536104FDOQ536104
Authors: Toshihiro Matsumura, Noriaki Matsushima 
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.b.kobe-u.ac.jp/papers_files/2009_05.pdf
Recommendations
- Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
- Full collusion vs. partial collusion in a spatial model: price and welfare comparison
- Cournot competition and spatial agglomeration revisited.
- A model of location choice: Cournot competition and spatial agglomeration
- Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Spatial models in economics (91B72)
Cites Work
- On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity
- Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
- Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome.
Cited In (17)
- Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model
- Full collusion vs. partial collusion in a spatial model: price and welfare comparison
- Welfare properties of strategic R\&D investments in Hotelling models
- Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing
- The nature of equilibria under noncollusive product design and collusive pricing
- Heterogeneous firms, urban costs and agglomeration
- Competition among large and heterogeneous small firms
- Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
- Product differentiation in a vertical structure
- Information asymmetry as a source of spatial agglomeration
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
- Vertical contract and competition intensity in Hotelling's model
- Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
- Endogenous flexibility in the flexible manufacturing system
- Cournot competition and spatial agglomeration revisited.
- Agglomeration as spatial interdependence between firms and households
This page was built for publication: Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q536104)
