The nature of equilibria under noncollusive product design and collusive pricing

DOI10.1142/S0219198921500134MaRDI QIDQ5094544zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kali P. Rath, Gongyun Zhao

Publication date 3 August 2022

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500134

zbMATH Keywords

transportation costunique equilibriumsubgame perfect Nash equilibriumminimal product differentiationprofit possibility frontier

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in economics (91B72) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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Cites work

• Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Dynamic product positioning in differentiated product markets: the effect of fees for musical performance rights on the commercial radio industry
• Introduction to the symposium on discontinuous games
• Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome.
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications

Cited in

(3)

• Supplier encroachment under nonlinear pricing with imperfect substitutes: bargaining power versus revenue-sharing
• Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome.
• Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.

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