Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90124-2zbMATH Open1328.91207OpenAlexW2049152959MaRDI QIDQ899797FDOQ899797

Nicholas Economides

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90124-2

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cites Work

• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Equilibrium in simple spatial (or differentiated product) models

Cited In (38)

• Retail location competition under carbon penalty
• Strategic multi-store opening under financial constraint
• An extended Hotelling model with different product quality
• Hotelling rents in Hotelling space: Product differentiation in exhaustible resource markets
• Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium in the linear city model
• A hybrid equilibrium in segmented markets: The three-firm case
• Product Imitation, Product Differentiation and International Trade
• Location game on disjoint line segments
• Location games with references
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Product differentiation and location decisions under demand uncertainty
• Dynamic Hotelling duopoly with linear transportation costs
• Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome.
• Location-price competition in airline networks
• Vertical separation with location-price competition
• Location, location, location
• Location choice with asymmetric data in the Hotelling model
• Pay-what-you-want in competition
• Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling's model: reestablishing equilibrium
• Robust equilibria in location games
• Optimal product differentiation in a circular model
• On competitive sequential location in a network with a decreasing demand intensity
• Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly under demand uncertainty
• Self-organized agglomerations and transport costs
• Product differentiation in a vertical structure
• Dynamics of Hotelling triopoly model with bounded rationality
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• On microfoundations of the city
• Two-player location-price game in a spoke market with linear transportation cost
• On the price of anarchy in a single-server queue with heterogeneous service valuations induced by travel costs
• A Hotelling model with production
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets
• A LOCATION GAME ON DISJOINT CIRCLES
• Hotelling's competition with relative performance evaluation
• Location models as models of product choice
• Two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition
• A NOTE ON PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN A LINEAR CITY AND WAGE BARGAINING

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