Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90124-2zbMath1328.91207OpenAlexW2049152959MaRDI QIDQ899797

Nicholas Economides

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90124-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

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Cites Work

• Equilibrium in simple spatial (or differentiated product) models
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"

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