Location-price competition in airline networks

DOI10.1155/2014/494103MaRDI QIDQ2336474zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 19 November 2019

Published in Journal of Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/494103

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games involving graphs (91A43) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Review text

Summary: This paper addresses location-then-price competition in airline market as a two-stage game of \(n\) players on the graph. Passenger's demand distribution is described by multinomial logit model. Equilibrium in price game is computed through best response dynamics. We solve location game using backward induction, knowing that airlines will choose prices from equilibrium for the second-stage game. Some numerical results for airline market under consideration are presented.

Recommendations

• Airline revenue management games with simultaneous price and quantity competition
• Competitive location on networks under delivered pricing
• Market and Locational Equilibrium for Two Competitors
• Competitive location and pricing on networks with random utilities
• Nash equilibria in location games on a network

Cites work

• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Competitive facility location: the Voronoi game
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• LOCATION GAME ON THE PLANE
• Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"

Cited in

(7)

• Competition in a deregulated air transportation market
• Frequency competition among airlines on coordinated airports network
• Competitive allocation of resources on a network: an agent-based model of air companies competing for the best routes
• Analysis on games between airlines and high-speed rail based on Bertrand model
• Airline revenue management games with simultaneous price and quantity competition
• Location-price competition in mobile operator market
• Analyses of location-price game on networks with stochastic customer behavior and its heuristic algorithm

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