Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00855-2MaRDI QIDQ6187471zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lucas Pahl

Publication date 31 January 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.01647

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionBayesian repeated gamesinformation spillover

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Abstract: This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a generalization of the Aumann et al. [1] two-player zero-sum one-sided incomplete information model. Under a correlated prior, the informed player faces the problem of how to optimally disclose information among two uninformed players in order to maximize his long-term average payoffs. Our objective is to understand the adverse effects of information spillover" from one game to the other in the equilibrium payoff set of the informed player. We provide conditions under which the informed player can fully overcome such adverse effects and characterize equilibrium payoffs. In a second result, we show how the effects of information spillover on the equilibrium payoff set of the informed player might be severe.

Recommendations

• Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592678
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4064801
• Sequence of opponents and reduced strategies
• Player Type Distributions as State Variables and Information Revelation in Zero Sum Repeated Games with Discounting

Cites work

• A first course on zero-sum repeated games
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• Convex Analysis
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
• Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns
• Generalized Gradients and Applications
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099353 (Why is no real title available?)
• Interactive information design
• Mathematical foundations of game theory
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
• The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type

This page was built for publication: Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6187471)