Equilibria in social belief removal

DOI10.1007/S11229-010-9763-XMaRDI QIDQ625714zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard Booth, Thomas Meyer

Publication date 25 February 2011

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9763-x

zbMATH Keywords

belief mergingbelief removalbelief revisionequilibriummulti-agent systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Knowledge representation (68T30) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Review text

The aim of this paper is to define and study new notions of equilibria in belief merging. The belief merging problem occurs when several agents pool their beliefs together to form a consistent ``group picture of the world. It is assumed that agents arrive at consistency via the use of a social belief removal function in which each agent, using his own individual removal function, removes some belief from his stock of beliefs. Several notions of equilibria are considered and their inter-relation is discussed. Existence of equilibria is also studied. It is also shown how equilibria can be seen as a generalization of the idea of taking maximal consistent subsets of agents.

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Cited in

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