Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality
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Publication:2292734
Recommendations
- Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
- Generalized Nash equilibrium with stable belief hierarchies in static games with unawareness
- Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Equilibrium without independence
Cites work
- Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Non-cooperative games
- Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
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