Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108526zbMATH Open1429.91067OpenAlexW2962511579WikidataQ127498394 ScholiaQ127498394MaRDI QIDQ2292734FDOQ2292734

Authors: Christian W. Bach, Andres Perea 

Publication date: 5 February 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526

Recommendations

• Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
• Generalized Nash equilibrium with stable belief hierarchies in static games with unawareness
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• Equilibrium without independence

zbMATH Keywords

existenceNash equilibriumepistemic game theorygeneralized Nash equilibriumincomplete informationcomplete informationinteractive epistemologysolution conceptsstatic gamescommon belief in rationalityepistemic characterization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality

Cited In (2)

• Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
• Generalized Nash equilibrium with stable belief hierarchies in static games with unawareness

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