On the implications of integrating linear tracing procedure with imprecise probabilities
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Publication:2374516
DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2016.09.001zbMath1400.68223OpenAlexW2519771533MaRDI QIDQ2374516
Publication date: 15 December 2016
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2016.09.001
coordinationcommon priorsets of probability distributionsstrategic uncertaintylinear tracing procedure
Noncooperative games (91A10) Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37)
Cites Work
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