On the foundations of game theory: the case of non-archimedean utilities

DOI10.1007/BF01753434zbMath0236.90077WikidataQ57403879 ScholiaQ57403879MaRDI QIDQ2552451

Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1971

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items

DYADIC THEORETICAL GAMES MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING FOR THE LEXICOGRAPHIC VECTOR PAYOFFS ⋮ Ockham efficiency theorem for stochastic empirical methods ⋮ Coalitional strategic games ⋮ Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences ⋮ A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium without independence ⋮ Equivalent decision trees and their associated strategy sets ⋮ Elementary non-Archimedean utility theory

Cites Work

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• Non-cooperative games
• One-way Expected Utility with Finite Consequence Spaces
• A Study of Lexicographic Expected Utility
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom