On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games
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Publication:2502425
DOI10.1007/S11238-005-3986-1zbMATH Open1119.91008OpenAlexW2134693726MaRDI QIDQ2502425FDOQ2502425
Authors: Caroline Berden, Hans Peters
Publication date: 12 September 2006
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/770500/guid-2dbef7ac-bfe4-4961-b297-1723e765a727-ASSET1.0.pdf
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Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
- On taxed matrix games and changes in the expected transfer
- When the players are not expectation maximizers
- Risk and interaction aversion: screening mechanisms in the prisoner's dilemma game
- The effects of risk preferences in mixed-strategy equilibria of \(2\times \)2 games
- On loss aversion in bimatrix games
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