Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games

DOI10.1007/BF01076104zbMath0776.90097MaRDI QIDQ2368040

Jonathan H. Hamilton, Steven M. Slutsky

Publication date: 22 August 1993

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01076104

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; endogenous timing; Stackelberg; Cournot; mixed strategy equilibrium; sequential play; extended games; simultaneous move subgame

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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On the Commitment Value and Commitment Optimal Strategies in Bimatrix Games, Policy stable states in the graph model for conflict resolution, Commitment games, On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation, Sequential commitment games, HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN A DIFFERENTIATED COURNOT OLIGOPOLY

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