Equilibria for far-sighted players

DOI10.1007/BF00125875zbMATH Open0531.90102OpenAlexW2018945314MaRDI QIDQ788647FDOQ788647

Authors: D. Marc Kilgour 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00125875

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zbMATH Keywords

Algorithmsnon-cooperative gameslong-term stabilityextended non-myopic equilibriaextended von Neumann-Morgenstern solutionnew equilibrium conceptrational far-sighted players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Staying power in sequential games

Cited In (17)

• Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria
• Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium
• Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games
• Generalized metarationalities in the graph model for conflict resolution
• Far-sighted equilibria in 2\(\times 2\), non-cooperative, repeated games
• The graph model for conflicts
• The decision support system GMCR in environmental conflict management
• Conflict models in graph form: Solution concepts and their interrelationships
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria
• Non-strict ordinal 2\(\times 2\) games: A comprehensive computer-assisted analysis of the 726 possibilities
• Algorithms for hierarchical power
• Some concepts of non-myopic equilibria in games with finite strategy sets and their properties
• Combining strength and uncertainty for preferences in the graph model for conflict resolution with multiple decision makers
• Staying power in sequential games
• Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games
• Policy stable states in the graph model for conflict resolution

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