The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.027zbMath1255.91038OpenAlexW2031717519MaRDI QIDQ1934111

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184337

zbMATH Keywords

discountingrepeated gameconflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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