Staying power in sequential games

DOI10.1007/BF00125673MaRDI QIDQ1052248zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Steven J. Brams, Marek P. Hessel

Publication date 1983

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

sequential gamesPareto-superior outcomerational terminationstaying power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2129302 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3813385 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3827625 (Why is no real title available?)
• Equilibria for far-sighted players
• Game theory and power indices
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Non-cooperative games
• Staying power in sequential games
• The Banzhaf power index for political games

Cited in

(4)

• Equilibria for far-sighted players
• Far-sighted equilibria in 2\(\times 2\), non-cooperative, repeated games
• Algorithms for hierarchical power
• Staying power in sequential games

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