Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game

DOI10.2307/2526998zbMath0815.90035OpenAlexW2006952533MaRDI QIDQ4320057

Jennifer F. Reinganum, Andrew F. Daughety

Publication date: 15 January 1995

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526998

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information acquisitionstatic homogeneous-good duopoly model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (7)

Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games ⋮ DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP ⋮ Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information ⋮ Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly ⋮ Supply chain disruption risk management through strategic information acquisition and sharing and risk-sharing contracts ⋮ Endogenous timing, market research, and demand uncertainty ⋮ Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly

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