On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2004.12.009MaRDI QIDQ2581301zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter

Publication date 9 January 2006

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

NTU games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
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Cites work

• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• An existence theorem for a bargaining set
• The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets
• The epsilon core of a large replica game

Cited in

(6)

• A non-weakly balanced game with non-empty bargaining set
• The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets
• Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
• A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
• Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach

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