The bargaining set of a large game

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0433-XzbMATH Open1203.91014OpenAlexW1967863885MaRDI QIDQ971889FDOQ971889

Luigi Montrucchio, Massimiliano Amarante

Publication date: 17 May 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0433-x

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zbMATH Keywords

market gamesLyapunov convexity theoremMas-Colell bargaining setcore-equivalencemaximal excess gamethin games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

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Cited In (7)

• On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set
• The bargaining set and the core in mixed markets with atoms and an atomless sector
• A characterization of exact non-atomic market games
• The bargaining set of four-person balanced games
• Stable cores of large games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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