The bargaining set of a large game

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0433-XMaRDI QIDQ971889zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Massimiliano Amarante, Luigi Montrucchio

Publication date 17 May 2010

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0433-x

zbMATH Keywords

core-equivalenceLyapunov convexity theoremmarket gamesMas-Colell bargaining setmaximal excess gamethin games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(12)

• The bargaining set and the core in mixed markets with atoms and an atomless sector
• On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set
• The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games
• The bargaining set of four-person balanced games
• Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics
• On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players
• Stable cores of large games
• On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4202067 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978448 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization of exact non-atomic market games
• The bargaining set in strategic market games

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