On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0694zbMath0952.91008OpenAlexW2062300040MaRDI QIDQ1304004

Ezra Einy, Dov Monderer, Ron Holzman

Publication date: 5 December 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1dcae3a5ef9948201a698cc24efa08faf582007b

zbMATH Keywords

least coreMax-Colell bargaining setmeasurable space of players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (5)

The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection ⋮ Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs ⋮ The bargaining set of a large game ⋮ On the accessibility of core-extensions ⋮ Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms

Cites Work

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• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• Quasi-cores in bargaining sets
• Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
• An existence theorem for a bargaining set
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games

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