The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection

DOI10.1186/1029-242X-2011-138zbMATH Open1273.91332OpenAlexW2150019216WikidataQ59267948 ScholiaQ59267948MaRDI QIDQ366127FDOQ366127

Authors: Paula Curt, Cristian M. Litan, D. Filip 

Publication date: 11 September 2013

Published in: Journal of Inequalities and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1186/1029-242x-2011-138

Recommendations

• A mathematical revisit of modeling the majority voting on fixed-income quadratic taxations
• On income taxation and the core
• Fiscally stable income distributions under majority voting, Lorenz curves and bargaining sets
• Voting over income taxation
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingleast corefixed-income taxationsmarginal-rate progressivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Voting over income taxation
• On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
• Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?
• Popular support for progressive taxation

Cited In (4)

• A mathematical revisit of modeling the majority voting on fixed-income quadratic taxations
• A note on the nonneutral taxation of indexed government bonds under alternative indexation schemes
• Fiscally stable income distributions under majority voting, Lorenz curves and bargaining sets
• Title not available (Why is that?)

This page was built for publication: The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q366127)