The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection

DOI10.1186/1029-242X-2011-138zbMATH Open1273.91332OpenAlexW2150019216WikidataQ59267948 ScholiaQ59267948MaRDI QIDQ366127FDOQ366127

D. Filip, Paula Curt, Cristian M. Litan

Publication date: 11 September 2013

Published in: Journal of Inequalities and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1186/1029-242x-2011-138

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingleast corefixed-income taxationsmarginal-rate progressivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Voting over income taxation
• On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
• Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?
• Popular support for progressive taxation

Cited In (2)

• A note on the nonneutral taxation of indexed government bonds under alternative indexation schemes
• Title not available (Why is that?)

This page was built for publication: The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q366127)