A mathematical revisit of modeling the majority voting on fixed-income quadratic taxations

DOI10.1155/2010/329378MaRDI QIDQ535477zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Paula Curt, Cristian M. Litan, D. Filip

Publication date 13 May 2011

Published in Journal of Inequalities and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://eudml.org/doc/230840

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
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Cites work

• Fiscally stable income distributions under majority voting, Lorenz curves and bargaining sets
• Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?
• Popular support for progressive taxation
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Voting over flat taxes in an endowment economy
• Voting over income taxation

Cited in

(4)

• Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

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