A mathematical revisit of modeling the majority voting on fixed-income quadratic taxations

DOI10.1155/2010/329378zbMATH Open1214.91028OpenAlexW2002124584WikidataQ59253209 ScholiaQ59253209MaRDI QIDQ535477FDOQ535477

Authors: Paula Curt, Cristian M. Litan, D. Filip 

Publication date: 13 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Inequalities and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eudml.org/doc/230840

Recommendations

• The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
• Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
• Voting over income taxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Voting over income taxation
• Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?
• Popular support for progressive taxation
• Voting over flat taxes in an endowment economy
• Fiscally stable income distributions under majority voting, Lorenz curves and bargaining sets

Cited In (4)

• Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

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