Voting over income taxation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.02.008MaRDI QIDQ2373775zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Efe A. Ok

Publication date 16 July 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

discontinuous gamesmixed strategy equilibriumprogressive taxationelectoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• A positive theory of income taxation
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
• Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules
• A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1351867 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
• Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Distributive politics and electoral competition
• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
• Existence theorems of Nash equilibria for non-cooperative n-person games
• Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
• Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Personal Income Taxation and the Principle of Equal Sacrifice Revisited
• Popular support for progressive taxation
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Voting over flat taxes in an endowment economy

Cited in

(23)

• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• A mathematical revisit of modeling the majority voting on fixed-income quadratic taxations
• Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
• A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
• Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games
• On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games
• Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation
• Voting over flat taxes in an endowment economy
• Tax morale, tax system and the median voter
• On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
• Voting on redistribution with tax evasion
• Borda-optimal taxation of labour income
• A positive theory of income taxation
• Uncertainty and the size of government
• The political viability of a negative income tax
• Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games
• A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters
• On the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria
• Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules
• On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income
• The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
• Popular support for progressive taxation

This page was built for publication: Voting over income taxation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2373775)