Voting over income taxation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.02.008zbMATH Open1156.91339OpenAlexW3121501535MaRDI QIDQ2373775FDOQ2373775

Authors: Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Efe A. Ok 

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.008

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• A positive theory of income taxation
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zbMATH Keywords

discontinuous gamesmixed strategy equilibriumprogressive taxationelectoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?
• Popular support for progressive taxation
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
• Distributive politics and electoral competition
• Voting over flat taxes in an endowment economy
• Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Personal Income Taxation and the Principle of Equal Sacrifice Revisited
• Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
• Existence theorems of Nash equilibria for non-cooperative \(n\)-person games

Cited In (22)

• Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
• A mathematical revisit of modeling the majority voting on fixed-income quadratic taxations
• A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
• On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games
• Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games
• Tax morale, tax system and the median voter
• Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation
• Borda-optimal taxation of labour income
• On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
• A positive theory of income taxation
• Voting on redistribution with tax evasion
• Uncertainty and the size of government
• The political viability of a negative income tax
• Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games
• A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters
• On the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria
• Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules
• On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income
• The least core in fixed-income taxation models: a brief mathematical inspection
• Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
• Popular support for progressive taxation
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation

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