Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
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Publication:1680737
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.05.008zbMATH Open1415.91128OpenAlexW3124365371MaRDI QIDQ1680737FDOQ1680737
Myrna Wooders, Anne van den Nouweland
Publication date: 16 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.05.008
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Cites Work
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Strongly stable networks
- The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- Share equilibrium in local public good economies
- Game theory
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
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