Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.12.006zbMath1155.91347OpenAlexW1992440073MaRDI QIDQ999730

Toyotaka Sakai

Publication date: 10 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalityArrow's impossibility theoremprice mechanismlocal independencesocial ordering functionWalrasian social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Local strict envy-freeness in large economies

Cites Work

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• The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation
• A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
• On the existence of maximal elements
• A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
• A characterization of the Walras rule
• Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
• Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes
• Social Welfare Function and Social Indifference Surfaces
• Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria
• Smooth Preferences
• The Coefficient of Resource Utilization

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