On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:274064
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.008zbMath1347.91015OpenAlexW2290200628MaRDI QIDQ274064
Publication date: 22 April 2016
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.008
Related Items (5)
A differentiable characterization of local contractions on Banach spaces ⋮ A strong correspondence principle for smooth, monotone environments ⋮ On the existence of stable equilibria in monotone games ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique maximum with an application to potential games ⋮ Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A differentiable characterization of local contractions on Banach spaces
- Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- Global stability of unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and rent-seeking game
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
- Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
- The stability of the Cournot oligopoly model: a reassessment
- Stability and instability in oligopoly
- Nine kinds of quasiconcavity and concavity
- Recent directions in matrix stability
- Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
- Stability of the Cournot process -- experimental evidence
- From evolutionary to strategic stability.
- Is a unique Cournot equilibrium locally stable?
- On the indices of zeros of Nash fields
- Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
- Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods
- Matrix Analysis
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- Multiplicity of Equilibria and Comparative Statics
- Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
- Evolutionary Games in Economics
- A Third Remark on the Number of Equilibria of an Economy
- Equilibria in symmetric games: Theory and applications
- Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
- A Note on the Stability Conditions in Cournot's Dynamic Market Solution When Neither the Actual Market Demand Function Nor the Production Levels of Rivals are Known
- Two Remarks on the Number of Equilibria of an Economy
This page was built for publication: On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
